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1961] RECENT DECISIONS 643 
LABOR LAW-FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION-STATE POWER To ExcLUDE Ex-
FELONS FROM UNION OFFICE-A New York statute, implementing a con-
gressionally-approved interstate compact,1 prohibits a waterfront union from 
collecting dues if any officer of the union has been convicted of a felony, 
unless he has been subsequently pardoned or given a certificate of good 
conduct by the parole board.2 In response to a threat of prosecution by the 
defendant district attorney, plaintiff's international union suspended him 
from his local union office on a showing that he had been convicted of 
grand larceny in 1920. Plaintiff sought in a declaratory suit to have the 
statute declared unconstitutional and to have its operation enjoined. The 
New York trial court granted defendant's motion for judgment on the plead-
ings;a this was affirmed by the appellate division4 and by the court of 
appeals.G On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed, 
three Justices dissenting.a Despite potential conflict with the National 
Labor Relations Act7 and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure 
Act of 1959,8 the state statute does not violate the supremacy clause of the 
1 Interstate Waterfront Commission Compact, N.J REv. STAT. § 32:23-1 (Supp. 1960); 
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS§ 6700-aa (McKinney 1960); approved by Congress, 67 Stat. 541 (1953). 
2 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 6700-ww (McKinney 1960). 
3 11 Misc. 2d 661, 166 N.Y.S.2d 751 (Sup. Ct. 1957). 
4 5 App. Div. 2d 603, 174 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1958). 
G5 N.Y.2d 236,157 N.E.2d 165, 183 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1959). 
6 The Chief Justice and Justices Douglas and Black, dissenting, found that Congress 
had intended to regulate the qualifications for union office by federal not state law. 
'l Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1958). 
8 Landrum-Griffin Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (Supp. I, 1959). 
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Constitution9 since Congress has demonstrated its intent to permit this 
form of state regulation of labor activities. De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 
(1960). 
Fifteen years ago the Court held in Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson10 that 
Florida could not prohibit ex-felons from acting as union business agents in 
opposition to the federal statutory policy of allowing employees full freedom 
to select their bargaining representatives.11 Although the Court distin-
guished the Hill case12 on its facts, the reasoning of the principal case serves 
to underscore the change which has occurred in the Court's method of 
determining whether Congress meant to preclude state power.13 A pre-
sumption in favor of a congressional intent to pre-empt, implicit in the 
Hill decision, became fully developed in a series of cases which treated the 
potential conflict between state and federal regulation in terms of "occupa-
tion" of the area by Congress; this, correspondingly, was said to displace 
state power.1 4 In contrast, the present view is that "the doctrine of pre-
emption does not present a problem in physics but one of adjustment be-
cause of the interdependence of federal and state interests and of the inter-
action of federal and state powers."15 In balancing the national and state 
interests, the Court has consistently recognized an overriding state interest in 
the control of violence arising from labor disputes.1 6 Although there was 
no imminent threat of violence endangering the public safety, the principal 
case can be interpreted as an extension of the violence rule to state labor 
regulation designed to have a direct curative effect upon a crime-infested 
local situation which has been perpetuated by intimidation and violence.11 
In addition to the compelling state interest, a specific national interest 
in the exclusion of ex-felons from union office was expressed by Congress 
9 The Court also rejected contentions that the statute violated the due process clause, 
and the provisions prohibiting bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. This note is 
limited to a discussion of the question of federal pre-emption. 
10 325 U.S. 538 (1945). 
11 National Labor Relations Act §§1, 7, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 151, 157 (1958). 
12 "An element most persuasive here, congressional approval of the heart 0£ the state 
legislative program explicitly brought to its attention, was not present in that case.'' Prin-
cipal case at 155. While this finding of congressional approval of the state legislation in 
1953 may overcome objections relating to potential conflict with the precedent NLRA, the 
Court does not attempt to project that approval forward to the LMRDA of 1959. Professor 
Hays suggests that restrictions of other states on employees' choice of bargaining agent will 
continue to be pre-empted by the NLRA when they have not been approved by Congress. 
Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor Law - October Term, 1959, 60 CoLuM. L. REV. 901, 
908 (1960). 
18 See generally Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REV. 
1297 (1954); Hays, Federalism and Labor Relations in the United States, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 
959 (1954); Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor 
Relations, 59 CoLUM. L. REV. 6 (1959). 
14 See International Union, UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950) and authorities cited 
therein at 457. 
15 Principal case at 152. 
1G See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247-48 (1959) and 
authorities there cited. 
17 See principal case at 158. 
1961] RECENT DECISIONS 645 
in section 504 (a) of the LMRDA.1 8 This provision bars most, but not all, 
ex-felons from union office, and only for a limited period. When a state re-
stricts a federally-guaranteed right more narrowly than Congress itself has re-
stricted it, the state action has been held to be in conflict with the federal law 
and hence unconstitutional.to However, where the federal legislative history 
indicates that Congress intended to allow such state regulation, the more 
stringent state restrictions are permissible.20 Thus, in the principal case the 
strict New York law barred plaintiff from his union office, although he 
would not have been excluded by section 504 (a) of the LMRDA. Never-
theless, the Court found in an express provision of the act that Congress 
did not intend to limit the responsibilities of union officials under state law.21 
Significantly, the Court also found that Congress, aware of the possible 
pre-emption implications when it enacted this statute,22 expressly provided 
for state exclusion when it intended to pre-empt in order to avoid pre-
emption by inference.23 The labor pre-emption pendulum has thus swung 
18 73 Stat. 536 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 504 (a) (Supp. I, 1959) provides: "No person who ••• 
has been convicted of ••• [specific serious felonies] ••• shall serve - (I) as an officer •.• 
of any labor organization •.• for five years after such conviction or after the end of such 
imprisonment, unless prior to the end of such five-year period .•• the Board of Parole of 
the United States Department of Justice determines that such person's service .•• would 
not be contrary to the purposes of this Act." 
10 Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Ry. Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Bd., 340 U.S. 383,394 (1951). 
20 Algoma Plywood &: Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 
301 (1949). 
21 LMRDA § 603 (a), 73 Stat. 540 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 523 (a) (Supp. I, 1959) provides: 
"Except as explicitly provided to the contrary, nothing in this chapter shall reduce or limit 
the responsibilities of any labor organization or any officer .•• under the laws of any 
State ..•• " The Court considered it a legal responsibility of the union and the plaintiff 
under the laws of New York to keep the plaintiff from holding union office. But see dissent 
at 164 n.4 where Justice Douglas argues that § 603 (a) was intended to apply only to the 
fiduciary responsibilities imposed by § 501 of the act. 
22 The extent to which the entire act was framed with the pre-emption problem clearly 
in mind is uncertain. "The final enactment, as Congressman Griffin has candidly stated, 
was a 'scissors and paste' job conjoined with the results of intensive, high-pressure bargain-
ing in the conference committee ...• The report filed by the house managers of the con• 
fcrence contains much that is confusing as well as clarifying. Thus, resort to legislative 
history will at best be difficult, and may serve more to obscure than to illuminate legislative 
intent." Smith, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 46 VA. L 
REv. 195, 197-98 (1960). For a discussion of the difficulties of ascertaining congressional 
intent in labor pre-emption cases, see Cox&: Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 
HARV. L. REV. 21 I, 223-31 (1950). 
23 Principal case at 156 referring to LMRDA §§ 205 (c), 403, 73 Stat. 528, 534 (1959), 
29 U.S.C. §§ 435 (c), 483 (Supp. I, 1959). Compare H.R. 3, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) 
passed by the House of Representatives (but not the Senate) while the LMRDA was under 
consideration - "No act of Congress shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part 
of Congress to occupy the field in which such Act operates, to the exclusion of all state 
laws on the same subject matter, unless such Act contains an express provision to that 
effect, or unless there is a direct and positive conflict between such Act and a State law so 
that the two cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together"-with Amalgamated 
Ass'n of Street Ry. Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., supra note 19, at 
!197-98-"Congress knew full well that its labor legislation 'preempts the field that the act 
covers insofar as commerce within the meaning of the act is concerned' and demonstrated 
its ability to spell out with particularity those areas in which it desired state regulation to 
be operative." 
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from a presumption of displacement of state power wherever Congress leg-
islates, through a middle-ground balancing-of-interests test, toward a pre-
sumption against pre-emption unless Congress othenvise indicates its intent. 
The prospect of an express pre-emption doctrine for the LMRDA raises 
hopes that this act may be spared the pre-emption confusion that continues 
to plague the NLRA. This possibility may prove to be an illusion. The 
literal language of the Court,24 if applied to other provisions of the act, 
would compel a result that Congress may not have anticipated. For example, 
it could be construed to allow the states to impose additional bonding re-
quirements on union officers,2 5 prohibit all loans by unions to their officers 
or employees,26 or require additional detailed financial and other reports 
concerning labor activities.27 Congressional intent to allow such state regu-
lation will surely prove more difficult to divine than in the principal case, 
and the Court may be expected to revert to the ad hoc balancing of state 
and national interests in order to reconstruct hypothetically Congress' pre-
emption intent. Thus, use of an express pre-emption doctrine for the 
LMRDA should be confined to situations like the principal case where the 
pre-emption intent of Congress on a specific provision is readily discernible, 
or the application of an express pre-emption rule would not reach a differ-
ent result from the balancing-of-interests test because of an overriding state 
interest in the control of violence. 
Charles E. Voltz 
24 "When Congress meant pre-emption to flow from the 1959 Act it expressly so 
provided .•.. No such pre-emption provision was provided in connection with § 504 (a). 
That alone is sufficient reason for not deciding that § 504 (a) pre-empts § 8 of the Water-
front Commission Act." Principal case at 156. 
25 LMRDA § 502 (a), 73 Stat. 536 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 502 (a) (Supp. I, 1959), provides 
for personal bonds in amounts not less than ten percent of the funds handled by a union 
officer per year, but the bond is not to exceed $500,000. 
26 LMRDA § 503 (a), 73 Stat. 536 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 503 (a) (Supp. I, 1959), prohibits 
only those loans in excess of $2,000. 
27 LMRDA §§ 201-203, 73 Stat. 524 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (Supp. I, 1959), re-
quires extensive reports to be filed with the Secretary of Labor by labor organizations, 
their officers and employees, and by employers. Although § 205 (c), 73 Stat. 528 (1959), 29 
U.S.C. § 435 (c} (Supp. I, 1959), expressly precludes the states from requiring the same in-
formation required by the act, there is no provision relating to other information which 
might be required by states concerning labor activities. 
